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Abstract 
Several experimental procedures (e.g., adjusting amount, adjusting delay) have been 
used to study the effect that changes in amount of and delay to a reward have on the 
reward’s subjective value.  The present series of three experiments sought to test the 
implicit assumption that the underlying decision-making process (discounting) is 
identical regardless of the procedure used, and that all would converge on similar 
indifference points.  For each of the experiments, participants were initially tested on 
one of the adjusting tasks (Adjusting Immediate Amount, Adjusting Delayed 
Amount, or Adjusting Delay) and returned a week later to complete each of the 
remaining adjusting tasks.  The indifference points obtained from the initial adjusting 
task were used as the test parameters in the other two tasks.  That is, when 
participants completed the other two adjusting tasks, the amounts and delays 
experienced were identical to those from the initial adjusting task.  Since, in the other 
adjusting tasks, the participants experience the identical amounts and delays as the 
initial adjusting task, specific predictions, at the level of the individual, were possible.  
Participants in all three experiments also completed a fully randomized version of 
the initial choice task.  The results confirmed that, regardless of the choice task used, 
subjective value decreased as the delay to that outcome increased.  In addition, it was 





                                                                                              
  
delayed-amount tasks, but not under the adjusting-immediate-amount task, 
subjective value was determined not just by the amount of the outcome or the delay 
to its receipt, but to some degree by the manner in which the choices are presented 
(i.e., the context).  Therefore, when investigating intertemporal choice, the adjusting-
immediate-amount procedure appears to provide the most reliable and valid 

















 TEMPORAL DISCOUNTING: A COMPARISON OF ADJUSTING-AMOUNT 
AND ADJUSTING-DELAY PROCEDURES 
Situations often present themselves in which a decision must be made 
between two outcomes, one of which is available sooner than the other.  At the 
individual level, for example, do you invest money in a retirement plan knowing you 
cannot have access to the money until you retire, or do you keep the money in a 
savings account where the interest earned is lower but you can have immediate 
access?  At the theoretical level a fuller understanding of the factors related to how 
an individual evaluates the choice alternatives and then arrives at a decision is 
important.  That is, when careful observation of choice behavior is made and the 
patterns of behavior are reliable, it then becomes possible to make assertions 
regarding potential underlying mechanisms.  Therefore, how an individual evaluates 
the choice alternatives and arrives at a decision are important at both the individual 
and the theoretical level. 
When people choose between large and small rewards, or when they choose 
between sooner and later rewards, the choices made are relatively easy to predict:  
Individuals typically choose the larger reward to the smaller reward, and the sooner 
to the later reward.  Consider, however, a choice between a smaller reward to be 
received soon and a larger reward to be received later.  In this situation each 
preferred choice dimension is paired with a non-preferred choice dimension.  That is, 
immediacy (preferred) is paired with a smaller reward (non-preferred), and delay 
(non-preferred) is paired with the larger reward (preferred).  Predicting choice 
behavior in this context is more difficult and less intuitive.  But why might an 
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individual forgo the larger reward for the smaller reward?  According to a 
discounting explanation, the present (subjective) value of a reward decreases as a 
function of the time until its receipt (e.g., Kagel, Battalio, & Green, 1995).  In the 
current example, then, given enough of a delay to the larger reward, the smaller-
sooner reward will be preferred.  Temporal discounting is the term used by 
economists and psychologists to refer to the decrease in the present value of a reward 
as the delay to its receipt increases.       
There are two bodies of literature concerning the effects of delay on choice 
behavior: the economic and psychological.  The economic literature on temporal 
discounting is grounded in classic economic theory which assumes rational choice 
behavior on the part of the decision maker.  Several challenges to the assumptions of 
classical economic theory with regard to time preference have been raised (e.g., 
Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992; Thaler, 1981).  For their part, psychologists have been 
concerned less with underlying economic principles and macroeconomic issues and 
more with the development of quantitative models that accurately describe empirical 
findings at the individual and group level. 
Economics and Time Preference 
Economists have attempted empirical tests of factors related to decision-
making that fall under the rubric of microeconomics (e.g., consumer behavior).  In 
the 1940s and 1950s, for example, economists came to be interested in psychological 
aspects of choice behavior (for a review of the historical antecedents see Fishburn, 
1988, 1989; Kahneman, 1991).  One group of economists was primarily interested in 
how people choose what to do given uncertainty about the consequences (e.g., von 
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Neuman & Morgenstern, 1944).  That is, these economists were interested in factors 
related to an individuals’ decisions given assumptions of rational behavior.  
Instances in which individual’s choice behavior deviated systematically from that 
predicted by classic economic theory were uncovered (e.g., Loewenstein & Prelec, 
1992; Thaler, 1981). 
The standard economic theoretical approach to intertemporal choice was built 
on the framework of the general discounting model or discounting utility model 
(DU).  In DU, the value of a future outcome decreases exponentially as the time to 
its receipt increases (Samuelson, 1937) and can be expressed as, 
   U0 = ∑ δ tut ,     (1) 
where Uo is the present value of the outcome, ut is the utility obtained from that 
outcome at time t, and δ is a discount factor, assumed to be less than 1.0.  There are 
two core assumptions associated with DU: a strong form of preferential 
independence and stationarity.  The independence property states that if two 
temporal prospects, X = (x1, x2, x3, ...xn) and Y = (y1, y2, y3, ...yn), share a 
common outcome at a given point in time, then preference between them is 
determined solely by the remaining (n -1) outcomes.  Put another way, preferential 
independence assumes that if temporal prospect X is preferred over temporal 
prospect Y, then the addition of temporal prospect Z should not change the ordinal 
relationship between X and Y. 
The stationarity assumption states that if the first outcome in both X and Y is 
the same, x1 = y1, then preference between X and Y will be preserved by dropping 
the first outcome and shifting the remaining outcome by one period.  This 
3  
                                                                                              
assumption implies that whenever two sequences differ in only two periods, 
preference between them does not depend on the common outcomes in the remaining 
periods.  For example, Equation 1 suggests that a 1-month delay will lead to the 
same rate of discounting if you were choosing between this month and next month or 
between next year and next year plus one month.    
DU is a normatively based theory (i.e., one that describes what people should 
do), but many economists would argue that it also serves as a descriptive theory 
(predicts what the consumer will do).  This view has received a great deal of 
attention by economists (as early as Strotz, 1956) and numerous systematic 
inconsistencies (violations) in what people do have emerged.  Loewenstein and 
Prelec (1992) compiled a list of such violations which include: the common 
difference effect, the absolute magnitude effect, the gain-loss asymmetry, and the 
delay-speedup asymmetry (also see Thaler, 1991), each of which is summarized 
below. 
The common difference effect refers to the dynamically inconsistent behavior 
found as the delay to two outcomes increases (i.e., preference reversal).  For example, 
given a choice between $20 today and $50 in 3 months, an individual might prefer 
$20 today.  If a constant delay of 1 year were added to each alternative, preference 
might reverse to the larger reward.  Preference reversals were first noted by Strotz 
(1956) and later systematically investigated by Ainslie (1975, 1985).  Preference 
reversals are consistent with the view that rate of discounting decreases as the delay 
increases, whereas DU assumes that the rate of discounting remains constant. 
4  
                                                                                              
The absolute magnitude effect refers to the decrease in rate of temporal 
discounting as a function of the amount of reward.  More specifically, as the amount 
of reward increases, the rate of discounting decreases.  This effect has been 
demonstrated using both hypothetical (e.g., Green, Myerson, & McFadden, 1997; 
Kirby, 1997; Thaler, 1981) and real (e.g., Lagorio & Madden, 2005; Johnson & 
Bickel, 2002) rewards.  The fact that smaller amounts are discounted at a higher rate 
than are larger amounts violates the assumption of DU that discount rates should be 
the same for all amounts of rewards of the same type.   
The gain-loss asymmetry refers to the finding that losses are discounted at a 
lower rate than are gains.  Thaler (1981) asked one group of participants to imagine 
that they were issued a traffic ticket (the size of the fine varied from relatively small 
to relatively large), and then informed the participants that the fine could be paid 
now (at face value) or that the fine could be paid later but at an increased price (the 
delay of payment ranged from sooner to relatively distant).  Participants were then 
asked to indicate the amount of money they would be willing to pay to postpone 
paying the traffic ticket.  Thaler asked another group to imagine that they had just 
won a lottery, and then informed them that they could take the money now or wait 
until later and receive a larger amount.  These participants were then asked to 
indicate the amount of money they would require to postpone the receipt of the 
winnings.  Thaler found that gains (lottery win) were discounted at much higher rates 
than were losses (traffic ticket) of equivalent amounts, and especially so with smaller 
outcomes.  That is, when paying the fine, participants were willing to pay 
proportionally more immediately (lower rate of discounting) as compared to those 
5  
                                                                                              
participants in the lottery condition where they were willing to take proportionally 
less immediately (higher rate of discounting).  Further evidence for the gain-loss 
asymmetry has been obtained by Loewenstein (1988) and Benzion et al. (1989).  
Again, DU assumes discount rates to be the same for all types of outcomes (e.g., 
gains and losses). 
The delay-speedup asymmetry (Loewenstein, 1988) refers to the asymmetric 
preference between speeding up and delaying consumption.  That is, the amount an 
individual requires to compensate for delaying the receipt of a positive outcome by a 
given time interval is several times greater than the amount that same individual 
would sacrifice to speed consumption up by the same time interval.  To illustrate this 
effect, consider the study by Loewenstein (1988; Experiment 3) in which high-
school students were told that they were to receive a $7 gift certificate to a music 
store.  The students were told that the expected time to the receipt of the certificate 
was either in one, four, or eight weeks (across different groups of students).  Some 
students were then asked to make a choice between keeping their certificate at the 
originally scheduled time or trading for a larger certificate to be received later, 
whereas other students were asked to make a choice between keeping their certificate 
or trading for a smaller certificate to be received earlier.  For example, some subjects 
were asked to make a trade-off between the size of a reward and its delayed 
consumption from 1 week to 4 weeks, whereas other students were asked to make a 
trade-off between the size of a reward and its speed-up from week 4 to week 1.  In all 
comparisons, the mean delay consumption was at least twice the mean speed-up cost.  
For instance, in one condition, students would accept $1.09, on average, to delay the 
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receipt of the $7 gift certificate from 1 week from now to 4 weeks from now, 
whereas they were only willing to pay $0.25, on average, to speed up the delivery of 
the gift certificate from 4 weeks from now to 1 week from now.  That is, subjects 
wanted more money (approximately 4 times the money) to wait past the expected 
arrival point than they were willing to pay to speed up its arrival (also see Benzion et 
al., 1989, for similar findings).  This asymmetry is problematic for DU because the 
pairs of choices are functionally identical.   
In response to the aforementioned problems of DU, Loewenstein and Prelec 
(1992) proposed an alternative model that takes the form of a generalized hyperbola 
and is represented by 
   V = v (1 + k T)-b/k,            (2)                                    
where V is present discounted value, v is undiscounted value, T is expected delay, 
and k and b are positive constants.  Note that when k = b, the equation becomes a 
simple hyperbola, and when k approaches 0 the equation becomes an exponential 
function.  The form of the hyperbola allows for temporal inconsistencies for which 
the exponential model (Equation 1) cannot account.  That is to say, only the 
hyperbola allows for changing rates of discounting as a function of delay. 
Psychology and Time Preference 
As mentioned previously, a larger reward typically will be preferred to a 
smaller reward, but if one had to wait a period of time before the larger reward could 
be obtained, then the smaller reward might be the preferred alternative.  Preference 
reversals make apparent the importance of an outcome’s temporal aspect.  For 
example, one might prefer to receive $100 right now rather than $120 one month 
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from now.  If, however, the choice were between $100 in one year and $120 in 13 
months, one might choose the $120.  Notice that preference reverses from the 
smaller-sooner reward to the larger-later reward as an equal amount of time is added 
to the receipt of both alternatives. 
Preference reversals may be represented as shown in Figure 1 (e.g., Ainslie, 
1975).  The vertical axis represents the subjective, or discounted, value of a future 
reward, and the horizontal axis represents time.  In this representation, the further to 
the left, the further in time from the rewards, and moving to the right (from T1 to T2) 
represents moving closer in time to the rewards.  The heights of the bars represent 
the actual reward amounts.  The curves show how their subjective values might 
change as a function of the time at which the rewards are evaluated.  Such curves are 
termed discounting functions because they indicate how the value of a future reward 
is devalued with its delay.  According to the representation in Figure 1, if one were 
offered the choice between the smaller-sooner (SS) and the larger-later (LL) rewards 
at time 1 (T1), well in advance of when the smaller reward can be obtained, one 
would chose LL, whereas if one were offered a choice between the same rewards at 
time 2 (T2), one would chose SS.   
Preference reversals are a violation of the stationarity assumption that 
underlies the discounted utility model of classic economic theory.  Preference 
reversals can be accounted for, however, if the form of the discounting function takes 
a hyperbolic form (as illustrated in Figure 1).   
The results of studies with both humans and nonhuman animals show 
violations of the stationarity assumption and are consistent with a discounting 
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account.  For example, in a study by Green, Fisher, Perlow, and Sherman (1981), 
pigeons chose, by pecking illuminated response keys, between two alternatives.  A 
peck to one response key led to a smaller-sooner food reward, and a peck to the other 
response key led to a larger-later food reward (see procedural schematic in Figure 2).  
In this procedure there were two distinct trial periods:  the first period (30 s in 
duration) was the choice period, and the second period (10 s in duration) was the 
outcome period.  In different conditions, the pigeons’ were presented with the 
illuminated keys at different points in time within the 30-s choice period, and a key 
peck to either response key led to its respective outcome.  For example, in one 
condition the choice opportunity was presented 25 s before the outcome period (see 
the top diagram in Figure2), whereas in another condition the choice opportunity was 
presented 5 s before the outcome period (see the bottom diagram in Figure 2). 
As can be seen in Figure 3, when the choice was offered further in advance of 
the outcome period, analogous to T1 in Figures 1 and 2, each pigeon strongly 
preferred the larger-later reward.  When the choice was offered shortly before the 
outcome period, analogous to T2, each pigeon demonstrated a reversal in preference, 
now strongly preferring the smaller-sooner reward. 
Using a procedure similar to Green et al. (1981), Green, Fristoe, and Myerson 
(1994) observed preference reversals in humans making choices between 
hypothetical monetary rewards.  Figure 4 shows that as the delay to both choice 
alternatives (i.e., $20 and $50) was increased while the interval between the two 
alternatives (time between receipt of the SS and receipt of the LL) was held constant 
(e.g., at 1 year), the percentage of participants who reversed their preference and 
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chose the later, $50 reward increased, as predicted by the discounting account.  
Preference reversals, such as these, have been demonstrated over a considerable 
range of species (both human and nonhuman) and procedures (Ainslie & Haendel, 
1983; Ainslie & Herrnstein, 1981; Green & Estle, 2003; Kirby & Herrnstein, 1995; 
Mazur, 1987; Rachlin & Green, 1972; Rodriguez & Logue, 1988).     
According to the discounting account represented in Figure 1, preference 
reversals occur because the subjective value of the larger-later reward decreases 
more slowly as its receipt becomes more delayed than does the subjective value of 
the smaller-sooner reward.  However, this description of the discounting of smaller 
and larger rewards does not greatly constrain the form of the discounting function, 
even though the shape of the function is assumed to underlie the preference-reversal 
phenomenon.  Recent efforts to determine the actual form of the temporal 
discounting function have been motivated by a desire to better understand preference 
reversals, as well as by the fact that different function forms have different 
theoretical implications for the discounting process.  
 There is a growing body of research attempting to elucidate the form of the 
discounting function.  In early work, for instance, Mazur (1987) had pigeons make 
choices between smaller-sooner and larger-later food rewards.  Mazur used an 
adjusting-delay procedure to find points of subjective equivalence (indifference 
points) between SS and LL rewards.  Specifically, Mazur presented pigeons with the 
choice between 2-s access to grain after a fixed delay and 6-s access to grain after a 
delay that systematically increased or decreased as a function of the pigeon’s 
previous choices.  For example, if the pigeon chose 2-s access to grain delayed by 2 
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s, then the delay to the 6-s access to food would decrease by 1 s for the next trial.  If 
the pigeon chose the larger (6-s access to grain) alternative, then the delay to that 
alternative would be increased by 1 s for the next trial.  When the length of delay to 
the larger alternative stabilized, it was treated as the indifference point for that given 
set of conditions (e.g., 2-s delay followed by 2-s access to grain versus an adjusted 
delay value followed by 6-s access to grain).  Across conditions, the delay to the 2-s 
access to grain was either: 0, 1, 2, 6, 10, 12, 14, or 20 s.  Since all pigeons were 
tested across a range of conditions, several indifference points were obtained, each 
indifference point representing the different amount and delay of reinforcement 
combinations equally preferred by a pigeon.   
Given the range of indifference points, Mazur (1987) was able to evaluate the 
descriptive ability of several quantitative models of choice that take into account 
reinforcers of various amounts and delays.  The first model was the simple reciprocal 
equation, in which reinforcer value is directly proportional to its amount and 
inversely proportional to its delay.  The equation takes the form: 
     V = A / k D ,            (3) 
where V is the subjective value, A is the amount of delayed reward, D is the delay to 
the receipt of the reward, and k is a scaling parameter.  This reciprocal equation 
(which follows from the generalized matching law) is appealing because it has one 
free parameter and presents a simple relationship between reinforcer value, amount, 
and delay.  The free (weighting) parameter, k, represents rate of discounting.  A large 
k value represents a high rate of discounting, a steeper curve, whereas a smaller k 
value represents a lower rate of discounting.  The equation predicts that a truly 
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immediate reinforcer will always be chosen over a later reward, regardless of their 
respective amounts.  This problem was easily remedied by a second equation in 
which 1 was added to the denominator of Equation 1.  The resulting equation takes 
the form:  
V = A / (1 + k D) ,                   (4) 
and was labeled hyperbolic (Mazur, 1987, 1988).   
 A third model is the exponential, representative of Samuelson’s (1937) 
standard Discounting Utility model, and which assumes a certain amount of risk 
inherent with any reward in which the receipt is delayed a specified period of time: 
V = A –k D.                     (5) 
This “rational” model assumes a constant hazard rate, or stationarity, and leads 
directly to a temporal discounting function in the form of an exponential decay.  A 
criticism of this model is that it does not, by itself, predict preference reversals unless 
the discounting rate for a larger amount is assumed to be lower than the discounting 
rate for a smaller amount (Green et al., 1981; Green & Myerson, 1993).  Mazur 
(1987) found that the hyperbolic equation (Equation 4) better described the obtained 
data in his experiment than the reciprocal (Equation 3) or exponential decay 
(Equation 5) functions. 
The iterative choice procedure of Mazur (1987), termed the adjusting- delay 
procedure, has been used to assess the present value of some distal reward across a 
variety of manipulations (Mazur, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987; Mazur, Snyderman, & 
Coe, 1985).  The adjusting-delay procedure serves to hone in on an indifference 
point between a smaller-sooner and a larger-later reward through systematic 
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adjustments of the length of delay to the larger reward.  For example, a subject may 
be presented a choice between a given smaller-sooner reward and a given larger 
reward where there would be a range of delays to the larger reward.  Notice here that 
the dimension that is adjusted by the participant is the length of the delay to the 
larger reward, and the experimenter controls the size of the immediate reward and 
the size of the larger reward.  As such, the dependent variable in an adjusting-delay 
procedure is the length of the delay to the larger reward.   
The adjusting-delay procedure has proven to be an efficient method for 
eliciting indifference points across a range of choice parameters allowing for tests 
among the descriptive abilities of several models of choice (e.g., Christensen, Parker, 
Silberberg, & Hursh, 1998).  Rodriguez and Logue (1988) employed this sort of 
iterative procedure as a test of the cross-species (pigeon and human) generality of 
temporal discounting and found that the hyperbolic model (Equation 4) well 
described the obtained results for both pigeon and human.  Pigeons, however, tend to 
discount rewards at a much higher rate than humans, as indicated by the size of their 
discount parameter (e.g., k as found in Equation 4).  Despite the differences in 
discount rates (k) across organisms, Rodriguez and Logue found that a hyperbolic 
model provided a better description of the empirical data than did the exponential 
decay model.   
An alternative, but related, choice task, referred to as the adjusting-amount 
procedure, often is employed to determine the amount of a (usually) hypothetical 
reward that can be received immediately and whose amount is adjusted until it is 
judged approximately equivalent in value to a larger reward that is to be delivered 
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after a given period of time (e.g., Rachlin, Raineri, & Cross, 1991; see also Green et 
al., 1997; Green et al., 1994).  Like the adjusting-delay procedure, the adjusting-
amount procedure adopts an iterative procedure that serves to hone in on the 
indifference value (present, subjective value).  In an adjusting-amount procedure, a 
subject is asked to indicate the immediate (present) value of a delayed outcome.  
There are several adjusting-amount procedures but the two most common procedures 
include a paper-and-pencil task and an iterative computer program.  The paper-and-
pencil task requires participants to make a choice between an immediate-smaller 
amount and a larger-delayed amount where the size of the smaller amount varies on 
each subsequent choice.  For example, a participant might be asked to indicate 
his/her preference between $198 available immediately and $200 available after 6 
months on the first choice, and then be asked to indicate preference between $195 
available immediately and $200 available after 6 months on the second choice, and 
so on.   
The iterative computer program also requires participants to make a series of 
choices between smaller-immediate rewards and larger-delayed rewards but in this 
case the size of the smaller reward is adjusted based on prior choice.  For example, a 
participant might be asked to indicate preference between $100 available 
immediately and $200 available after 6 months on the first choice and then, 
depending on the option selected, the size of the immediate reward would be 
increased or decreased.  If the participant chooses $200 in 6 months over $100 now, 
the next choice would be between $150 available immediately and $200 in 6 months.  
If the participant chooses the immediate alternative on the first choice (i.e., $100 
14  
                                                                                              
now over $200 in 6 months), then the next choice would be between $50 available 
immediately and $200 in 6 months.  This iterative procedure continues as a means of 
honing in on the size of the immediate reward that is subjectively equivalent to the 
larger, delayed reward. 
The commonality between the adjusting-amount procedures is that the 
dimension that is adjusted by the participant is the amount of the immediate reward, 
and the experimenter controls the delay to and the size of the larger reward.  As such, 
the dependent variable in an adjusting-amount procedure is the amount of the 
immediate reward.  The obtained immediate amount is referred to as the subjective 
value because it represents the amount that is subjectively equivalent to the larger but 
later reward.   
Data gathered via adjusting-amount procedures suggest that the hyperbolic 
model (Equation 4) describes temporal discounting of children, college-age, and 
older adults better than the exponential (Equation 5) (e.g., Green, Myerson, & 
Ostaszewski, 1999a).  The hyperbolic equation has been shown to describe temporal 
discounting across large and small hypothetical rewards (e.g., Green et al., 1997), 
under circumstances with extreme rates of inflation (Ostaszewski, Green, & 
Myerson, 1998), across cultures (Du, Green, & Myerson, 2002), in terms of health 
(Chapman, 1996), in gamblers and addicts (e.g., Petry & Casarella, 1999), and in 
smokers (Mitchell, 1999).  Additionally, the hyperbolic equation not only describes 
group average data but also accounts for discounting at the individual level when an 
adjusting-amount procedure is used (e.g., Green, Myerson, & Ostaszewski, 1999b; 
Myerson & Green, 1995). 
15  
                                                                                              
 
 
Statement of the Problem 
There are several possible approaches one could take when attempting to gain 
an understanding of choice behavior with regard to delayed rewards.  Two typical 
methodologies are the adjusting-delay procedure and an adjusting-amount procedure.  
With an adjusting-delay procedure, the experimenter controls the size of the smaller-
immediate and larger rewards, and the participant reports the length of time s/he 
would be willing to wait for the larger reward.  With an adjusting-amount procedure, 
the experimenter controls the size of and delay to the larger outcome, and the 
participant reports the amount s/he would be willing to accept immediately.  Both 
procedures serve to establish a point of indifference between a smaller-immediate 
and larger-delayed reward.  Regardless of the approach used, however, the question 
is always the same: How does delaying a reward affect that reward’s present value?   
There is a tacit assumption that the underlying decision-making process 
(discounting) is identical regardless of the methodology used to establish the 
indifference points.  This assumption may be based on animals’ always choosing the 
option with the highest value (Rachlin, 1992).  Although each of the methodologies, 
adjusting amount and adjusting delay, have demonstrated their usefulness in 
evaluating models of choice behavior in terms of delayed rewards, the only 
published research that has made a direct comparison of the procedures is in the non-
human literature using pigeons (Green, Myerson, Shah, Estle, & Holt, 2007).  Here 
pigeons were given a choice between a smaller-sooner outcome and a larger-later 
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outcome.  In different conditions of the experiment, either the size of the smaller-
sooner outcome was adjusted or the length of the delay was adjusted based on the 
pigeon’s previous choice.  The purpose of both task types was to arrive at a point of 
indifference between the smaller-sooner and larger-later outcome.  Green et al. then 
used these indifference points as the test parameters for the other task.  That is, if a 
pigeon first completed the adjusting-amount task, it then completed a yoked 
adjusting-delay task.  In the yoked adjusting-delay task the test values were yoked to 
the values obtained from the adjusting-amount procedure.  If a pigeon first 
completed the adjusting-delay task, the obtained indifference points were then yoked 
to the adjusting-amount task.  The central question was whether similar rates of 
discounting would be observed between the two task types.  The pigeons in the 
Green et al. study were consistent in their rates of discounting between the task types.  
In spite of the finding that the same rates of discounting were obtained under both 
procedures, important questions still remain regarding the cross-species generality of 
decision making (e.g., Green, Myerson, Holt, Slevin, & Estle, 2004), and some of 
these questions will be discussed later.  For instance, humans may be differentially 
affected by previous choices in ways that are different from non-humans (e.g., 
pigeons).  
The present work further evaluates whether the indifference points obtained 
with adjusting-amount and adjusting-delay procedures will be quantitatively similar 
using equivalent amounts and delays.  In other words, would an individual arrive at 
the same indifference point given an adjusting-amount procedure and adjusting-delay 
procedure under similar delay and amount parameters?  This issue is not only of 
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theoretical interest; it has implications for everyday decision making which often 
involves outcomes that differ on multiple dimensions, one of which includes the way 
in which the indifference point is obtained.   
Consider the situation in which an individual is studied via an adjusting-
amount procedure where the size of the immediate reward is varied.  Let’s say, for 
example, that the individual arrives at a subjective value of $940 now relative to 
$1000 in 2 months.  That is to say, for that individual, $940 now is subjectively 
equivalent to $1000 in 2 months.  The individual could now be studied with an 
adjusting-delay procedure in which the delay to the larger reward is varied.  Would 
that individual be willing to wait 2 months for the $1000 relative to receiving $940 
now?  Of critical importance here is that the monetary amounts and delays are the 
same across the two procedures.  The only difference, then, is whether the amount of 
the immediate reward or the delay to the larger reward is adjusted by the participant.   
If the decision-making process is independent of such methodological differences, 
then the individual should arrive at about the same indifference point (2 months in 
the current example). 
The Current Study   
In a typical discounting paradigm, participants are asked to make a series of 
choices between a smaller, immediate reward and a larger, delayed reward (e.g., 
“Would you prefer to receive $100 now or $200 in 3 months?”).  In such a 
discounting choice paradigm there are three choice variables that can be 
manipulated: (1) the amount of the immediate reward; (2) the amount of the larger 
but delayed reward; and (3) the delay to the larger reward.  The current study 
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involves three experiments in which participants made choices between immediate 
smaller rewards and delayed larger rewards.  For each of the experiments, each 
participant was tested on an adjusting task (i.e., Adjusting Immediate Amount, 
Adjusting Delayed Amount, and Adjusting Delay) where one choice dimension 
varied systematically.  In each of the three experiments participants also were tested 
on a fully randomized choice task (explained later). 
 Each participant was tested in two separate sessions, each session separated 
by approximately one week.  During the first session, participants were tested on one 
of the adjusting tasks.  The subjective values, or indifference points, obtained from 
the first session’s task then were used the following week as the test values in each 
of the remaining adjusting tasks.  The goal of these experiments was to determine if, 
when holding the choice parameters constant, each of the varied tasks would yield 
similar indifference points.  The distinction among the three experiments was the 
choice task used in the first session.  In the first experiment, a group of participants 
first was tested on the Adjusting Immediate Amount (AIA) task and returned in 
approximately one week and completed the remaining two choice tasks (i.e., 
Adjusting Delayed Amount, ADA, and Adjusting Delay, AD); in the second 
experiment, another group of participants first was tested on the ADA task and 
returned approximately one week later to complete the remaining two choice tasks 
(i.e., AD and AIA); and in the third experiment, another group of participants was 
first tested on the AD task and returned approximately one week later to complete 
the remaining two choice tasks (i.e., AIA and ADA).    
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In addition to the adjusting choice tasks, participants in all three experiments 
completed an additional task that was designed to address the issue of anchoring as 
related to the discounting tasks used.  In each of the three adjusting tasks, one of the 
choice dimensions was varied systematically from choice to choice while the other 
choice dimensions remained unchanged.  As a result of varying only one of the 
choice dimensions, the participant might place greater weight on the dimension that 
is being varied.  If there were to be systematic differences between the subjective 
indifference points obtained from the different procedures, then those differences 
could be due to differential weighting of the dimension being varied.  For example, 
in the AIA task the immediate amount is systematically adjusted until it is judged 
equal in value to a larger but delayed amount.  Because only the amount of the 
immediate reward systematically changes in the AIA task, the task itself may lead 
participants to give more weight to the choice dimension that varies – the immediate 
amount.  The purpose of the fully randomized version of this task was to determine if 
participants place greater weight on the choice dimension that is varied.  If 
differential weighting of choice dimensions were to be found, then this would be a 
challenge to the underlying assumption that regardless of the approach used, 
valuation of delayed outcomes should be the same regardless of how the question is 
posed.  Furthermore, any systematic differences between the task types would call 
into question the validity of those measures, especially if comparisons are being 
made between the task-types.  If trying to gain a fuller understanding of the factors 
that may contribute to the discounting of delayed outcomes, it is important to 
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evaluate the potential effects of task type and/or variation of the choice dimensions 




Approximately equal numbers (N = 31-36) of young adults (age 18-21 years) 
participated in each of the three experiments, resulting in a total of 100 participants.  
All participants were recruited via the subject pool of the Psychology Department of 
Washington University and received course credit as compensation for participation. 
Procedure 
Each of the 3 experiments involved 2 separate testing sessions.  The first 
session served to establish a series of baseline indifference points for each participant.  
These baseline indifference points were then used as the starting points for the 
second testing session, which was completed approximately 1 week following the 
first session.  There a total of 102 participants that completed the first session with 2 
participants not returning to complete the second testing session.     
In the first session, participants were asked to sign a consent form and 
complete a brief demographics questionnaire.  Following completion of the 
demographics questionnaire, participants completed a computer-based discounting 
task.  Before the start of the discounting task, each participant received verbal and 
written instructions as well as a set of practice trials to become familiar with the task.  
To minimize the likelihood of participants remembering their specific choices from 
session 1 to session 2, there was an interval of approximately one week between 
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sessions.  In addition to the one-week interval, participants performed several similar, 
but non-critical, decision-making tasks during the first testing session.  These non-
critical tasks were presented in a manner consistent with the critical test items, but 
the amounts and delays presented were different from those used in the critical tests.  
Although participants were not asked if they remembered their choices from the 
previous week, it was expected that with the one-week interval between sessions, the 
number of choices in the discounting task (144 total), and the additional tasks, it 
would be unlikely that they would remember their specific choices from session 1 to 
session 2. 
At the beginning of the discounting tasks, participants were instructed that 
they would be making choices between hypothetical amounts of money presented on 
a computer screen.  They were told that their choices would be between an amount 
that could be received immediately and another amount that could be received after a 
given delay.  Participants were also instructed that there are no correct or incorrect 
responses and that they should select the option they prefer.  For each subsequent 
choice, the adjusted value was either increased or decreased as a function of the 
current choice.  For each amount x delay condition, participants made a total of 6 
choices (details as to the specific amount and delay conditions will follow).  This 
iterative method of adjustment is designed to converge rapidly on the indifference 
point.  Total time to complete the first session was never more than 45 min. 
Adjusting Immediate Amount Task.  For the Adjusting Immediate Amount Task 
(AIA), individuals were asked to indicate their preference between a smaller, 
immediate reward and a larger, delayed reward where the size of the smaller 
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immediate reward was systematically varied and the amount of and delay to the 
larger reward was held constant.  There were 2 delayed amounts ($200 and $40,000) 
available at each of six delays (2 weeks, 1 month, 6 months, 1 year, 3 years, and 6 
years), for a total of 12 conditions.  The order of presentation of the 12 conditions 
was randomized for each participant.   
For the AIA task, the smaller-immediate reward is varied, in an iterative manner, 
as a means of honing in on the individual’s indifference points.  That is, the program 
was designed to reveal the immediate amount that is subjectively equivalent in value 
to the larger, delayed reward.  For instance, in the $200 in 6 months condition, the 
participant first chose between $100 now and $200 in 6 months (on the first choice, 
the immediate amount was always half the delayed amount).  If the participant 
selected the $100 now, then the subsequent choice would be between $50 now and 
$200 in 6 months.  If on that choice the immediate $50 was selected, then the next 
choice was between $25 now and $200 in 6 months.  If the participant now chose the 
$200 in 6 months, then the next choice was between $37 now and $200 in 6 months.  
Notice that the change in size of the immediate amount was always half the prior 
amount in a direction towards indifference.  This process was repeated for each 
amount x delay condition yielding a total of 12 indifference points. 
Adjusting Delay Task.  For the Adjusting Delay Task (AD), individuals were 
asked to indicate their preference between a smaller, immediate reward and a larger 
delayed reward in which the length of the delay to the larger amount was 
systematically varied while the amounts of the smaller and larger rewards were held 
constant.  The delay to the larger reward was varied, in an iterative manner, as a 
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means of honing in on indifference between the length of the delay to the larger 
reward that makes the smaller, sooner reward subjectively equivalent in value to the 
larger reward. 
There were 2 delayed amounts ($200 and $40,000) each of which was paired 
with six different immediate amounts, for a total of 12 conditions.  The order of 
presentation of the 12 conditions was randomized for each participant.  When the 
delayed amount was $200, in different conditions the immediate amounts were $190, 
$155, $100, $50, $20, and $10.  When the delayed amount was $40,000, in different 
conditions the immediate amounts were $38,000, $31,000, $20,000, $10,000, $4,000, 
and $2,000. 
The iterative process was very similar to that experienced in the AIA task but 
with the length of delay to the larger outcome being varied.  For example, say the 
participant made a choice between an immediate $100 and $200 delayed by 3 years.  
If the immediate alternative were selected, the next choice was between an 
immediate $100 and $200 delayed by 1.5 years.  If the individual then chose the 
delayed alternative, the next choice was between an immediate $100 and $200 
delayed by 2 years and 3 months.  This process was repeated for each amount x 
delay condition yielding a total of 12 indifference points. 
Adjusting Delayed Amount Task.  For the Adjusting Delayed Amount Task 
(ADA), participants were asked to indicate their preference between a smaller, 
immediate and larger, delayed amount of money in which the amount of the delayed 
alternative was systematically varied while the immediate amount and delays were 
held constant.  The amount of the delayed reward was varied, in an iterative manner, 
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as a means of honing in on indifference between the smaller, immediate reward and 
the delayed reward, that is, an amount of a delayed reward that is subjectively 
equivalent to the smaller, immediate reward.  There were two immediate monetary 
amounts ($100 and $1,000) and six delays to the larger reward (2 weeks, 1 month, 6 
months, 1 year, 3 years, and 6 years), for a total of 12 conditions.  The order of 
presentation of the 12 conditions was randomized for each participant. 
As was the case in the AIA and the AD tasks, the iterative process in this task 
continued for a total of 6 choices and served to systematically hone in on the point 
where the present alternative was subjectively equivalent to the delayed alternative.  
In the ADA task, however, the amount of the delayed reward was varied.  Again, this 
process was repeated for each amount x delay condition, yielding a total of 12 
indifference points. 
Fully Randomized Task.  There were three Fully Randomized tasks: a Fully 
Randomized version of the AIA task, a Fully Randomized version of the AD task; 
and a Fully Randomized version of the ADA task.  For the Fully Randomized tasks, 
individuals were asked to indicate their preference between a smaller, immediate 
reward and a larger, delayed reward.  These tasks differed from each of the 
adjusting-type tasks, however, in that there was no immediately obvious, 
systematically varied, single dimension along which choice differed.  The Fully 
Randomized tasks served as a test for potential effects of adjusting-type choice tasks 
where the alternative that is adjusting is readily apparent.  In the aforementioned 
adjusting-type tasks, one of the choice dimensions was varied systematically from 
choice to choice in an effort to identify subjective equivalence while the two other 
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choice dimensions remained unchanged.  As a result of the systematic manipulation, 
a participant might place differential weight on the choice dimension that was varied.   
 For each of the three experiments, the critical reward amounts and delays 
were identical to those used in the initial task.  That is to say, participants first 
completing the AIA task experienced the identical choice questions in the anchoring 
task, but the presentation of each of the choice questions was randomized.  Likewise, 
those participants initially experiencing the ADA or AD tasks were presented with 
identical choice questions, respectively, but the presentation of each of the choice 
questions was randomized.  Recall that in the AIA task, for example, the size of the 
immediate reward systematically changed from question to question, and the delayed 
amount and the length of the delay did not change as the participant worked through 
a specific condition.  The randomization of the presentation of the questions in the 
anchoring task eliminated the systematic adjustment of one of the choice 
alternatives.   
In effect, there were 12 concurrently operating conditions in the Fully 
Randomized tasks, and the computer program randomly selected one condition to 
display at a time, for one choice, and then replaced that condition and sampled the 
conditions again for the next choice to be presented.  This random sampling of 
conditions continued until all 12 indifference points were established.  Of note here 
is that the iterative process was still in place in this task and that there were a total of 
6 questions per condition.  For example, the participant might first have been 
presented with a choice between $34,000 now and $40,000 in 2 weeks, then 
presented with a choice between $100 now and $200 in 6 months, then presented 
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with a choice between $1,140 now and $1,200 in 2 years, etc.  The distinguishing 
feature with this task was that once a choice had been made, the next choice was 
from a randomly selected amount x delay condition.  Of importance here is that 
when the participant returned to a specific amount x delay condition, the presented 
choice was based on the previous choice made in that specific amount x delay 
condition (i.e., the same iterative process as used in the other tasks). 
Experiment 1 
Participants 
 A total of 31 individuals participated in this experiment.  There were 12 
males and 19 females. 
Procedure 
 During the first testing session, participants completed both the standard AIA 
task and the Fully Randomized AIA task.  The 12 indifference points obtained from 
the standard AIA task provided the test values for the second testing session in which 
the participant completed the AD and ADA tasks.  For example, if the participant 
found $145 to be subjectively equivalent to $200 in 6 months, then when returning to 
complete the ADA task, that same participant was asked to indicate preference 
between an immediate $145 and various larger amounts delayed by 6 months.  
Likewise, when completing the AD task, that same participant was asked to indicate 
preference between an immediate $145 and a delayed $200, where the length of 
delay was systematically varied.   
In the second session, participants completed 12 conditions of the ADA task 
and 12 conditions of the AD task.  At issue was whether the values for the delayed 
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amount and the delay obtained from the second session would match the values from 
session 1. (In the previous example, this would correspond to obtaining a delayed 
amount of $200 in the ADA task and a delay of 6 months in the AD task).  Half of 
the subjects completed the ADA task followed by the AD task, whereas the other 
half completed the tasks in the reverse order (order of tasks was randomly 
determined).  Once a task had been selected, the order of conditions within each task 
was presented randomly. 
Experiment 1 Results 
 Figure 5 shows the median discounting data for both the standard and Fully 
Randomized AIA tasks from each amount condition ($200 and $40,000) from 
session 1.  Notice, for both amounts, that as the delay to receipt of the outcome 
increased the subjective value decreased.  Compared to the smaller amount condition, 
the delayed reward had a much greater subjective value in the larger amount 
condition.  This finding is consistent with the magnitude effect in which larger 
amounts are discounted less steeply than are smaller amounts.  Regardless of the size 
of the delayed amount, however, visual inspection of Figure 5 reveals no obvious 
systematic differences between the results for the standard AIA (closed triangles) 
and the Fully Randomized AIA tasks (open triangles) procedures. 
The curves in Figure 5 represent Equation 4 fit to the median subjective 
values obtained from the standard AIA and Fully Randomized AIA tasks.  At the 
group level, discounting was well described by Equation 4 for both tasks, and this 
was true for both delayed amounts (all R2s > .88).  Equation 4 was also fit to 
individual data.  Individual fits were done at each amount for both the standard AIA 
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and Fully Randomized tasks resulting in 4 discount curves for each participant.  In 
the standard AIA task, the means of the individual k values were .074 (standard error 
= .036) and .004 (standard error = .001) for the smaller and larger amounts, with 
mean R2s of .73 and .69, respectively.  For the Fully Randomized task, the 
corresponding means of the individual k values were 0.042 (standard error = 0.036) 
and 0.030 (standard error = 0.026) with mean R2s of .77 and .65, respectively).  A 
series of paired sample t-tests revealed no significant differences in k values or R2s 
between the two task types at either amount (all ps > .30).  There was a significant 
effect of amount; the smaller amount was discounted more steeply than the larger 
amount (t(30) =11.519, p < .001). 
Figure 6 shows the relationship between obtained and predicted indifference 
points for the three pairs of discounting tasks.  In each panel, the data are collapsed 
across delay conditions such that each bar represents the grand mean of the ratio of 
the values for the task types being compared, with the standard or non-yoked version 
of the task in the denominator.  Specifically, ratio values for the smaller and larger 
delayed amount conditions were calculated for each participant at each delay 
condition.  These ratio values were then logged and then averaged to get each 
participant’s mean log ratio.  The ratios were logged for each individual because the 
points were highly positively skewed.  Logging the values resulted in normally 
distributed data.  The ratios presented in Figure 6 are the anti-logs of the logged 
means.   
The top panel shows the mean ratios of the adjusted immediate amount 
values obtained in the Fully Randomized and standard versions of the AIA tasks for 
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both the smaller and larger delayed amount conditions.  To assess the consistency in 
choice behavior between the tasks, each participant’s adjusted immediate amount 
value from the Fully Randomized version of the AIA task was divided by the 
amounts obtained in the corresponding delay conditions of the standard AIA task.  
These ratio values were then logged and then averaged.  One sample t-tests (because 
the ratios were logged the critical value = 0) on the means of the logged ratios 
revealed no significant at either the smaller (t (30) = -1.052, p = 0.301) or the larger 
delayed amount condition (t (30) = -1.499, p = 0.114).  In the figure, a ratio of 1.0 
would indicate no difference between the task types. 
The middle panel of Figure 6 shows the adjusted delays obtained in the yoked 
AD task expressed as the ratio of their predicted values for both the smaller and 
larger delayed amount conditions (a ratio value of 1.0 would indicate no difference 
between the obtained delays from the yoked AD task and the delays experienced in 
the AIA task).  Recall that participants first experienced the AIA task in order to 
generate predictions as to their behavior on the other yoked procedures.  Participants 
first adjusted the smaller-immediate outcome until it was judged equal in value to a 
fixed, larger-later outcome (2 larger outcomes at each of 6 delays).  At issue was 
whether, in the second procedure (AD), given a previously obtained value for the 
immediate amount, participants would adjust the length of the delay until it was 
equal to that experienced in the AIA task.  For each participant, ratio values (delay 
values from the yoked AD task / delay values from the standard AIA task) for each 
condition were calculated.  These ratio values were logged and averaged to get each 
participant’s mean log ratio for both the smaller and larger amount conditions.  One 
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sample t-tests (because the ratios were logged the critical value = 0) on the means of 
the logged ratios revealed no significant difference between the obtained and 
predicted delay values for the smaller amount condition (t (30) = -1.754, p = .090), 
but there was a significant difference for the larger amount condition (t (30) = 4.792, 
p < .001).   
The bottom panel shows the adjusted delayed amounts obtained in the yoked 
ADA task expressed as a ratio of their predicted values (i.e., the delayed amounts 
experienced in the AIA task) for both the smaller and larger delayed amount 
conditions.  At issue was whether, in the second procedure (ADA), participants 
would adjust the delayed amount until it was about the same as that experienced in 
the AIA task (i.e., $200 or $40,000).  For each participant, ratio values (delayed 
amounts from the yoked ADA task / delayed amounts from the standard AIA task) 
for each delay condition were calculated at both the small and larger amount 
conditions.  These ratio values were logged and averaged to get each participant’s 
mean log ratio for both the smaller and larger amount conditions.  One sample t-tests 
on the means of the logged ratios revealed no significant difference in either the 
smaller (t (30) = 1.672, p = .105) or the larger delayed amount condition (t (30) =       
-.718, p = .478). 
Experiment 1 Discussion 
The data from Experiment 1 suggest that similar degrees of discounting are 
observed on standard and fully randomized adjusting immediate amount procedures.  
The fully randomized task differed from the standard AIA task in that there was no 
immediately obvious systematically varied dimension - but the critical reward 
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amounts and delays were identical to those used in the initial AIA task.  This is 
important because it is possible that a discounting procedure could establish different 
reference points (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) depending on which variable 
changes from trial to trial.  That is, as a result of the systematic manipulation, the 
participant might place greater weight on, or anchor, the choice dimension that was 
varied.  The data from both procedures yielded discount functions that were equally 
well described by a simple hyperbola, and at both the group (median) and individual 
levels, rates of discounting on the Fully Randomized and AIA tasks were similar.   
 Recall that the indifference points determined the values of the independent 
variables in the yoked AD and yoked ADA tasks.  For the yoked AD task, 
participants made a series of choices between amounts that could be received 
immediately (which were obtained from their choices on the initial AIA task) and 
larger (either $200 or $40,000) delayed amounts.  In this task, the length of the delay 
to the larger amount was systematically adjusted based on the participant’s choices 
in order to estimate the indifference point.  It was predicted that the delays at which 
the subjective value of the delayed amount was equivalent to that of the immediate 
amount would be similar to those experienced in the initial AIA task.  Although the 
results for the smaller delayed amount condition were consistent with this prediction, 
in the larger amount condition participants were willing to wait, on average, longer 
than would be predicted based on the delays experienced in the AIA task.  In terms 
of discounting, this translates to less discounting with the AD task when amounts are 
larger. 
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For the yoked ADA task, participants made a series of choices between 
amounts that could be received immediately (which were obtained from their choices 
on the initial AIA task) and a larger delayed amount.  In this task, the length of delay 
to the larger amount was the same as that experienced in the initial AIA task.  Here, 
however, the delayed amount was systematically adjusted based on the participant’s 
choices in order to estimate the indifference point.  It was predicted that the delayed 
amounts whose subjective values were equivalent to that of the immediate amount 
would be similar to the delayed amounts experienced in the initial AIA task (either 
$200 or $40,000).  When collapsed across the various delays, there were no 
significant differences between the obtained and predicted delayed amounts in either 
the smaller or larger delayed amount conditions. 
Experiment 2 
Participants 
 33 individuals participated in this experiment.  There were 14 males and 19 
females. 
Procedure 
During the first testing session, participants completed both the standard AD 
and the Fully Randomized AD tasks.  The 12 indifference points obtained from the 
standard AD task provided the test values for the second testing session in which the 
participant completed the AIA and ADA tasks.  For example, if the participant found 
an immediate $190 to be subjectively equivalent to $200 in 1.5 months, then when 
returning to complete the AIA task, that same participant was asked to indicate 
preference between $200 delayed by 1.5 months and various immediate amounts.  
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Likewise, when completing the ADA task, that same participant was asked to 
indicate preference between an immediate $190 and various delayed amounts to be 
received in 1.5 months.   
In the second session, participants completed 12 conditions of the AIA task 
and 12 conditions of the ADA task.  At issue was whether the values for the 
immediate and delayed amounts obtained from the second session would match the 
values from session 1.  (In the previous example, this would correspond to obtaining 
an immediate amount of $190 in the AIA task and a delayed amount of $200 in the 
ADA task).  Half of the subjects completed the ADA task followed by the AIA task, 
whereas the other half completed the tasks in the reverse order (order of tasks was 
randomly determined).  Once a task was selected, the order of conditions within each 
task was presented randomly. 
Experiment 2 Results 
Figure 7 shows the median discounting data for both the AD and Fully 
Randomized tasks from both the smaller (top panel) and larger (bottom panel) 
delayed amount conditions.  It should be noted that the x-axis is actually the 
dependent measure in this case.  The data are plotted in this manner to allow for 
direct comparison to the results from the AIA task in Experiment 1 and the prior 
literature.  For both the smaller and larger delayed amounts, subjective value 
decreased as delay to receipt of the outcome increased.  Notice also that the lengths 
of delays were different across the 2 amount conditions.  Compared to the smaller 
amount condition, the delays in the larger condition were much longer.  This finding 
is consistent with the magnitude effect in which larger amounts are discounted less 
34  
                                                                                              
steeply than are smaller amounts.  The finding that at the same delay, the subjective 
value of the larger delayed amount is a greater proportion of its actual value than is 
the subjective value of the smaller delayed amount is also consistent with the 
magnitude effect.   
The curves in Figure 7 represent Equation 4 fit to the median subjective 
values obtained from the standard AD and Fully Randomized AD tasks.  At the 
group level, discounting was well described by Equation 4 for both tasks, and this 
was true for both delayed amounts (all R2s > .87).  Equation 4 was also fit to 
individual data at each amount for both the standard AD and Fully Randomized tasks 
resulting in 4 discounting curves for each participant.  In the AD task, the mean of 
the individual k values were 0.045 (standard error = .011) and 0.007 (standard error 
= .002) with mean R2 of .76 and .71, for the smaller and larger amounts respectively.  
For the Fully Randomized task, the means of the individual k values were 0.040 
(standard error = 0.01) and .003 (standard error = 0.0005) with mean R2s of .76 
and .63 for the $200 and $40,000 delayed amounts, respectively.  Paired sample t-
tests revealed a significant difference in k values between the two task types for the 
larger amount (t (31) = 2.350, p = .025) but not for the smaller amount, and no 
significant difference in R2s between the two task types at either amount. 
Figure 8 shows the overall relationship between obtained and predicted 
indifference points for the three pairs of discounting tasks.  In each panel, the data 
are collapsed across delays such that each bar represents the grand mean of the ratio 
of the values for the task types being compared.  As was done in Experiment 1, the 
ratios were logged because they were highly positively skewed.  Logging the values 
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resulted in normally distributed data.  The ratios presented in Figure 8 are the anti-
logs of the logged means.   
The top panel shows the mean ratios of the adjusted delays obtained in the 
Fully Randomized and standard versions of the AD tasks for both the smaller and 
larger delayed amount conditions.  A ratio of 1.0 would indicate no difference 
between the task types.  To assess the consistency in choice behavior between the 
tasks, each participant’s adjusted delay from the Fully Randomized version of the 
AD task was divided by the delays obtained in the corresponding delay conditions of 
the standard AD task.  These ratio values were then logged and then averaged.  One 
sample t-tests (because the ratios were logged the critical value = 0) on the means of 
the logged ratios revealed differences between the standard and Fully Randomized 
AD tasks at both the smaller (t (32) = 3.745, p = .001) and larger amounts (t (32) = 
5.080,  p < .001).  This difference reflects the fact that the adjusted delays from the 
Fully Randomized task were longer than the obtained delays from the standard AD 
task.  
The middle panel of Figure 8 shows the adjusted immediate amounts 
obtained in the yoked AIA task expressed as the ratio of their predicted value (i.e., 
the immediate amounts experienced in the AD task) for both the smaller and larger 
amount conditions.  Recall that participants first experienced the AD task in order to 
generate predictions as to their behavior on the other yoked procedures.  At issue was 
whether, in the second procedure (AIA), participants would adjust the immediate 
amount until it was equal to that experienced in the AD task (a ratio value of 1.0 
would indicate no difference between the obtained immediate amounts from the 
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yoked AIA task and the immediate amounts experienced in the AD task).  For each 
participant, ratio values (immediate amounts from the yoked AIA task / immediate 
amounts from the standard AD task) for each condition were calculated.  These ratio 
values were logged and averaged to get each participant’s mean log ratio for both the 
smaller and larger amount conditions.  One sample t-tests (because the ratios were 
logged the critical value = 0) on the means of the logged ratios revealed no 
significant difference for the small delayed amount condition (t (31) = 0.723, p 
= .475), but there was a difference for the large delayed amount condition (t (31) = 
4.788, p < .001), reflecting the fact that the adjusted immediate amounts were larger 
than was predicted.   
The bottom panel of Figure 8 shows the adjusted delayed amounts obtained 
in the yoked ADA task expressed as the ratio of their predicted values (i.e., the 
delayed amounts experienced in the AD task) for both the smaller and larger delayed 
amount conditions.  At issue was whether, in the second procedure (ADA), 
participants would adjust the delayed amount until it was about the same as that 
experienced in the AD task (i.e., $200 or $40,000).  For each participant, ratio values 
(delayed amounts from the yoked ADA task / delayed amounts from the standard 
AD task) for each condition were calculated.  These ratio values were logged and 
averaged to get each participant’s mean log ratio for both the smaller and larger 
amount conditions.  One sample t-tests (because the ratios were logged the critical 
value = 0) on the means of the logged ratios revealed a significant difference for the 
small delayed amount condition (t (31) = 2.948, p = .006), reflecting the fact that the 
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adjusted delayed amounts were larger than was predicted, but no significant 
difference for the large amount condition (t (31) = -0.833, p = .411).   
 
Experiment 2 Discussion 
The data from Experiment 2 suggest that the Fully Randomized and standard 
AD tasks lead to different rates of discounting.  That is, for both the smaller and 
larger delayed amount conditions, discounting appeared to be greater on the standard 
AD task.  Recall that the Fully Randomized task differed from the standard task in 
that there was no immediately obvious systematically varied dimension, but the 
critical reward amounts and delays in both tasks were identical.  The difference in 
discounting on the two tasks is a potentially important finding because it suggests 
that systematically varying the delay on the standard AD procedure may affect 
participants’ reference points (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  That is, as a result 
of the systematic manipulation, participants might place greater weight on, or anchor, 
the choice dimension that was systematically varied.  In the present experiment, both 
AD procedures yielded discount functions that were equally well described by a 
simple hyperbola, but at the level of the group, the rates of discounting were 
different.  Because discounting was greater with the standard AD task, it appears that 
participants became differentially sensitive to the delays (which were changing from 
choice to choice) on this task, suggesting that their decisions about delays were 
affected by preceding questions. 
 Recall that the standard AD task was used to establish a series of indifference 
points that were then used in both a yoked AIA task and a yoked ADA task.  For the 
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yoked AIA task, participants made a series of choices between amounts that could be 
received immediately and a larger (either $200 or $40,000) delayed amount, using 
delays whose durations were established in the initial AD task.  In the AIA task, the 
immediate amount was systematically adjusted based on participants’ previous 
choices in order to find an estimate of the indifference point.  It was predicted that 
the participants would adjust the immediate amounts to values similar to those 
experienced in the initial AD task.  Consistent with this prediction, there was, on 
average, no difference at the $200 condition.  For the $40,000 condition, however, 
there was a difference between the yoked AIA and standard AD tasks.  Here 
participants required a larger immediate reward on the yoked AIA task than 
predicted based on their choices on the standard AD task at larger amounts.  In terms 
of discounting, this translates to less discounting on the yoked AIA task than 
predicted. 
For the yoked ADA task, participants made a series of choices between 
amounts that could be received immediately and a larger delayed amount, using 
delays whose durations were established in the initial AD task.  In the yoked ADA 
task, the delayed amount was systematically adjusted based on participants’ previous 
choices in order to determine their indifference points.  It was predicted that 
participants’ would adjust the amount of the delayed reward to values similar to 
those experienced in the initial AD task (either $200 or $40,000).  In the $200 
delayed amount condition, but not the $40,000 condition, there was a significant 
difference between the obtained and predicted delayed amounts.  In the initial AD 
procedure, participants indicated how long they were willing to wait for a larger 
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amount relative to an immediate but smaller amount.  When they were presented 
with those delays in the ADA task, the participants required a larger delayed amount 
than predicted.  In terms of discounting, this translates to more discounting on the 
yoked ADA task than on the AD task. 
Experiment 3 
Participants 
 At total of 36 individuals participated in this experiment.  There were 10 
males and 26 females. 
Procedure 
During the first testing session, participants completed both the standard 
ADA and the Fully Randomized ADA tasks.  The 12 indifference points obtained 
from the standard ADA task provided the test values for the second testing session in 
which the participant completed the AIA and AD tasks.  For example, if the 
participant found $100 to be subjectively equivalent to $132 in 2 weeks, then when 
returning to complete the ADA task, that same participant would be asked to indicate 
preference between an immediate $100 and various larger amounts delayed by 2 
weeks.  Likewise, when completing the AIA task, that same participant would be 
asked to indicate preference between some immediate amount and $132 in 2 weeks, 
where the amount of the immediate reward was systematically varied.   
In the second session, participants completed 12 conditions of the AD task 
and 12 conditions of the AIA task.  At issue was whether the values for the 
immediate amounts and the delays obtained from the second session would match 
the values from session 1.  (In the previous example, this would correspond to $100 
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in the AIA task and 2 weeks in the AD task.)  Half of the subjects completed the AIA 
task followed by the AD task whereas the other half completed the tasks in the 
reverse order (order of tasks was randomly determined).  Once a task had been 
selected, the order of conditions within each task was presented randomly. 
Experiment 3 Results 
Figure 9 shows the median discounting data for both the standard ADA and 
Fully Randomized ADA tasks from each immediate amount condition ($100 and 
$1,000).  Notice that for both amount conditions, the delayed amount increases as a 
function of delay to its receipt.  That is, as the delay to the larger outcome is 
increased, the delayed amount also increases.  Although no specific mathematical 
form for the relationship between the delayed amount and the delay to receiving the 
reward has been hypothesized, the data suggest an orderly relationship of the type 
expected.  That is, it would be expected that as the delay to receiving a reward 
increases, the amount of delayed reward that would be equivalent to a fixed 
immediate amount should increase.  This increase in amount of the delayed reward 
would serve to offset the discounting of the value of that outcome as the delay to its 
receipt increased.  Also notice that there are no apparent systematic differences 
between the standard and Fully Randomized tasks. 
Figure 10 shows the overall relation between obtained and predicted 
indifference points for the three pairs of discounting tasks.  In each panel, the data 
are collapsed across amounts such that each bar represents the grand mean of the 
ratio of the values for the task types being compared.  As was done in Experiments 1 
and 2, the ratios were logged because they were highly positively skewed.  Logging 
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the values resulted in normally distributed data.  The ratios presented in Figure 10 
are the anti-logs of the logged means. 
The top panel shows the ratios of the adjusted delays obtained in the Fully 
Randomized and standard versions of the ADA tasks for both the smaller and larger 
immediate amount conditions.  A ratio of 1.0 would indicate no difference between 
the task types.  To assess the consistency in choice behavior between the tasks, each 
participant’s adjusted delayed amount from the Fully Randomized version of the 
ADA task was divided by the delays obtained in the corresponding delay conditions 
of the standard ADA task.  These ratio values were then logged and then averaged.  
One sample t-tests (because the ratios were logged the critical value = 0) on the 
means of the logged ratios revealed no significant difference for the small immediate 
amount condition, (t (32) = 0.490, p = .627) but there was a significant difference in 
the large immediate amount condition (t (32) = -3.099, p = .004) reflecting the fact 
that the delayed amounts obtained from the Fully Randomized version of the ADA 
task were smaller than those from the standard version of the task. 
The middle panel of Figure 10 shows the adjusted immediate amounts 
obtained in the yoked AIA task expressed as a ratio of their predicted values (i.e., the 
immediate amounts experienced in the ADA task) for both the smaller and larger 
immediate amount conditions.  Recall that participants first experienced the ADA 
task in order to generate predictions as to their behavior on the other yoked 
procedures.  Participants first adjusted the delayed amount until it was judged equal 
in value to a fixed, immediate outcome at 6 delays in each of the two ($100 and 
$1,000) immediate amount conditions.  At issue was whether, in the second 
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procedure (AIA), participants would adjust the immediate amount until it was equal 
to that experienced in the ADA task.  For each participant, ratio values (immediate 
amounts from the yoked AIA task / immediate amounts from the standard ADA task) 
for each condition were calculated.  These ratio values were logged and averaged to 
get each participant’s mean log ratio for both the smaller and larger amount 
conditions.  One sample t-tests (because the ratios were logged the critical value = 0) 
on the means of the logged ratios revealed a significant difference for the smaller 
immediate amount condition (t (30) = 3.12, p = .004), reflecting the fact that the 
adjusted immediate amounts in this condition were larger than predicted, but no 
significant differences were observed for the larger immediate amount condition (t 
(30) = 1.33, p = .193). 
The bottom panel of Figure 10 shows the adjusted delays obtained in the 
yoked AD task expressed as the ratio of their predicted values (i.e., the delays 
experienced in the ADA task) for both the smaller and larger amount conditions.  At 
issue was whether, in the second procedure, participants would adjust the delays 
until it was the same as those experienced in the ADA task.  For each participant, 
ratio values (delay value from the yoked AD task / delay values from the standard 
ADA task) for each condition were calculated.  These ratio values were logged and 
averaged to get each participant’s mean log ratio for both the smaller and larger 
amount conditions.  One sample t-tests (because the ratios were logged the critical 
value = 0) on the means of the logged ratios revealed no significant difference for the 
small amount condition (t(30 ) = -1.50,  p= .143), but there was a difference for the 
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large amount condition (t(30) = 3.03, p = .005), reflecting the fact that the adjusted 
delays were longer than predicted. 
 
Experiment 3 Discussion 
The data from Experiment 3 suggest that there is an orderly functional 
relation between the delayed amount equal in subjective value to a fixed immediate 
amount and the length of the delay; not surprisingly, as the delay increases, there is 
an increase in the delayed amount.  This finding is important because this is the first 
experiment to systematically study discounting using an ADA procedure.  The data 
are consistent with discounting in that as the delay increased the amount of delayed 
reward necessary to counteract the increased degree of discounting and hold 
subjective value constant increased.  The data also appear consistent with previous 
findings of a magnitude effect.  That is, when looking at the proportions of the 
delayed amounts there are systematic differences between the $100 and $1,000 
conditions.  In terms of proportions, the delayed amount for the $100 condition was 
consistently larger than that of the $1,000 condition.  In terms of discounting, this 
translates to steeper discounting with the smaller amount, a finding that is consistent 
in the delay discounting literature. 
The data suggest that the Fully Randomized and standard ADA tasks lead to 
different rates of discounting.  Specifically, for the larger immediate amount 
condition discounting appeared to be greater with the Fully Randomized task.  Recall 
that the Fully Randomized task differed from the standard ADA task in that there 
was no immediately obvious systematically varied dimension, but the immediate 
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reward amounts and delays were identical to those used in ADA task.  This 
difference between the standard and Fully Randomized ADA task is a potentially 
important finding because it is possible that systematically varying the delayed 
amount affects participants’ reference points (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  In 
this case, differences in the results between the task types appear to also be related to 
the size of the outcome.  That is, the ADA task appears to be differentially sensitive 
to changes across more than one context-- decisions about delayed amounts are 
affected by preceding questions and the amount of the immediate reward involved. 
The ADA task was used to establish a series of indifference points that 
provided values for yoked AIA and AD tasks.  For the yoked AIA task, participants 
made a series of choices between amounts that could be received immediately and a 
larger delayed amount (the amount obtained from the initial ADA task).  In the AIA 
task, the immediate amount was systematically adjusted based on participants’ 
previous choices.  It was predicted that the immediate amounts that participants 
found equal in value to the delayed amounts would be similar to those experienced in 
the initial ADA task.  Data from the smaller immediate amount condition show that 
participants required, on average, larger immediate amounts as the delays to the later 
rewards increased.  For the larger immediate amount condition, there was no overall 
difference between the task types.  In the smaller immediate amount condition, the 
observed difference translates to less discounting on the AIA task than predicted 
from the ADA task.   
For the yoked AD task, participants made a series of choices between 
amounts that could be received immediately (either $100 or $1,000) and a larger 
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delayed amount obtained from the initial ADA task.  In this task, the length of the 
delay to the larger amount was systematically adjusted based on participants’ 
previous choices in order to determine the delay at which the immediate reward was 
subjectively equivalent to the delayed reward.  It was predicted that participants 
would adjust the delays to the values experienced in the initial ADA task.  This was 
true in the smaller immediate amount condition, but in the larger immediate amount 
condition, participants were willing to wait longer than predicted for the delayed 
reward, indicating that it was discounted less steeply than on the ADA task. 
General Discussion 
 The present series of experiments were designed to address the question as to 
whether similar discounting of delayed rewards would be observed when participants 
make choices using different experimental procedures that have been studied in the 
literature.  The implicit assumption in the literature is that the underlying decision-
making process (discounting) is identical regardless of the procedure used to 
establish the indifference points.  The present work tested this assumption by 
evaluating whether similar indifference points would be obtained from each of the 
procedures studied. 
 Three experiments were conducted in which participants experienced four 
different decision-making tasks: standard AIA, AD, and ADA tasks, and a Fully 
Randomized version of one of those tasks.  Differing between the experiments was 
the order in which the tasks were experienced.  In Experiment 1, participants first 
completed a standard and then Fully Randomized version of the AIA task, followed 
a week later by the completion of the AD and ADA tasks.  In Experiment 2, 
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participants first completed a standard and then Fully Randomized version of the AD 
task, followed a week later by the completion of the AIA and ADA tasks.  In 
Experiment 3, participants first completed a standard and the Fully Randomized 
version of the ADA task, followed a week later by the completion of the AIA and 
AD tasks.  The test values used for the standard and Fully Randomized tasks were 
identical.  The only variation between these task types was the manner in which each 
choice trial was presented.   In all three experiments, the completion of the standard 
task served to derive a series of indifference points which then were used as the test 
values for the remaining task types. 
 The results from each of the three experiments appear to be consistent with 
previous findings regarding discounting.  That is, in each of the three experiments 
participants were affected by increases in the delay to the receipt of an outcome in a 
similar way:  As the delay to the reward increased, the present value of that reward 
decreased, and the decrease in the present value of the reward was well described by 
a hyperbolic function.  The magnitude effect, a reliable finding in the discounting 
literature, also was observed in all three experiments:  Smaller delayed amounts were 
discounted more steeply than larger delayed amounts.  These findings support the 
validity of the various tasks and confirm their generality. 
 The results from Experiment 1 (AIA) showed there to be no significant 
differences between the standard and Fully Randomized versions of the task.  This is 
in contrast to Experiment 2 (AD) and Experiment 3 (ADA) where significant 
differences between the standard and Fully Randomized tasks were found with both 
smaller and larger amounts.  This difference in results suggests that decisions about 
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delays are affected by preceding questions, whereas, decisions about immediate 
amounts are not.  The preceding questions under the AD task, in which delays are 
adjusted, led to shorter delays than were obtained on the fully randomized version of 
the task.  That is, as the delays changed systematically from choice to choice, 
relatively more weight appears to be placed on the delay, which then translates into a 
higher degree of discounting on the standard AD task.  Even though there was a 
higher degree of discounting on the standard AD task, the data from the Fully 
Randomized and standard versions of the task were both well described by the same 
mathematical function.  If the same psychological process were to underlie decisions 
made in both cases, then the fact that the same mathematical function describes both 
equally well is a necessary but not a sufficient condition.  The same process may 
underlie decision making (qualitatively similar), regardless of how the alternatives 
are presented, but there remain quantitative differences in the rate of discounting.  It 
appears that the difference is driven by how the delayed outcomes are presented.   
Within task-type comparisons (Expt. 1 AIA versus Expt. 2 AIA; and Expt. 2 
AD versus Expt. 1 AD) also reveal differences between the AIA and AD task types.    
That is, when comparing discounting across the AIA tasks in Experiments 1 and 2 no 
reliable differences are observed (see Figure 11).  Notice that the range of delays 
experienced was different for both the smaller and larger amount conditions (top and 
bottom panels, respectively) and that at each amount condition the range of delays 
differed between the standard AIA and Yoked AIA.  Despite the differences in 
delays experienced (and that these are between subject comparisons), discounting on 
the AIA tasks was remarkably similar. 
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In contrast, when comparing discounting between the AD tasks, differences 
at the larger amount are apparent (see bottom panel of Figure 12).  The finding of a 
difference at the larger amount is potentially interesting given that the differences 
between the AD and AIA tasks found in Experiments 1 and 2 were also found only 
in the larger amount conditions.  Since the AIA task produced similar discounting 
both between the Fully Randomized and Standard tasks as well as between 
experiments, the difference found between the AIA and AD tasks would appear to 
derive from inconsistencies with the AD task.  That is, the fact that participants 
discount larger amounts on the AIA and AD tasks differently is likely to be due to 
the AD task.  Again, this pattern of results suggests that decisions about delays are 
affected by preceding questions.  As was the case with the AIA tasks, there were 
large differences in the range of delays between the AD tasks.  Unlike the AIA tasks, 
however, the range of delays may have affected discounting on the AD task.   
The reliability in findings between the AIA task-types indicates that both the 
standard and the fully randomized versions are well suited for assessing the 
subjective value of a delayed outcome.    That is, the data from the AIA tasks suggest 
that regardless of how the question is posed, individuals will provide consistent 
indifference points across a range of delays and at both smaller and larger amounts.  
This suggests that, although the AD task may prove informative in specific ways 
(discussed later), when choosing between delay discounting tasks, the AIA task may 
be superior to AD tasks. 
 The results from Experiment 3 (ADA) also point to differences between the 
standard and Fully Randomized versions of the ADA task.  This difference is similar 
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to that of Experiment 2 (AD) in that there appears to be context dependency on 
decision making with delayed outcomes.  In Experiment 3, the significant difference 
was isolated to the larger amount condition and indicates that the Fully Randomized 
version of the task leads to shallower discounting than the standard version.  With 
the standard ADA task, however, the type of context dependency is slightly different 
than that of the standard AD task (where it was the delay that changed from trial to 
trial).  With the standard ADA task the amount of the delayed outcome changes from 
trial to trial.  This suggests that context dependency is not isolated to that of the 
varying delays but also can involve delayed outcomes where the outcome varies 
from choice to choice.  More generally speaking, it may be better to think of context 
dependency as including the entirety of the delayed outcome, not just the delay to 
that outcome. 
Deviations between predicted and obtained values are apparent when looking 
at the results from the yoked AIA and AD tasks in Experiment 3.  With the yoked 
AIA task there was a significant difference at the smaller amount condition where 
the adjusted immediate amounts were larger than those initially presented in the 
standard ADA task.  This is in contrast to the findings from Experiment 1 where the 
adjusted delayed amounts by the participants on the yoked ADA were consistent 
with those experienced in the initial standard AIA task.  If the degree of discounting 
were consistent across all AIA tasks then any deviation from predicted value would 
be due to the ADA task.  This inconsistency between experiments is potentially 
problematic, however, when trying to establish some degree of internal consistency.  
That is, if differences are observed between the yoked AIA and standard ADA tasks 
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in Experiment 3, it would be expected that a similar pattern of differences would be 
found in Experiment 1 (yoked ADA and standard AIA).   
One factor that may have contributed to this apparent inconsistency is the 
variable that co-varied with the length of delay across conditions.  In Experiment 3, 
participants first completed the standard ADA task followed by the yoked version of 
the AIA task.  When participants returned to complete the yoked AIA task in 
Experiment 3, the delayed amounts were those that were established in the initial 
ADA task.  That is, the size of the delayed amounts varied across delay conditions 
when participants completed the yoked AIA task.  This is in contrast to Experiment 1 
where the delayed amount was always the same ($200) but the length of the delay 
changed across conditions when completing the standard AIA task.  Also important 
is that in Experiment 1, the size of the immediate amount varied across delay 
conditions when participants completed the yoked ADA task.  This is in contrast to 
Experiment 3 where the immediate amount was always the same ($100) but the 
length of the delay changed across conditions when completing the standard ADA 
task.  Within-task comparisons can be problematic because the specific procedure 
used to determine indifference points varied along more than one dimension.  That is, 
given that there are procedural differences between the tasks in Experiments 1 and 3, 
it becomes difficult to isolate the determining factor as to why there are 
inconsistencies in the findings.  If one were to assume, however, that the AIA task 
produces consistent results, then any differences observed between the AIA and 
ADA tasks is likely due to the context dependency of the ADA task.  Here, however, 
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context dependency likely depends on an interaction between a combination of 
factors which may include the previous choices made and the outcome amounts. 
The same issue is present when comparing the results between Experiment 3 
and Experiment 2 (ADA and AD).  Here the ADA and AD tasks are both context 
dependent which makes it difficult to isolate the important factor of context.  What 
can be said, however, is that the contextual factors appear to be related both to the 
previous choices made and to the overall size of the outcome, both of which may 
vary depending on the task type.   
 Given that the rate of discounting on both the AD and ADA tasks 
(Experiments 2 and 3) appear to be context dependent, researchers should approach 
using these task types with caution.  If, however, contextual factors are of interest, 
then these task types may provide an excellent avenue of study.  That is, if one were 
to investigate the specific effects of how previous decisions might influence current 
choice, then comparisons between the standard and the fully randomized version of 
the AD task may be particularly useful.  With the AD task there is a body of 
literature from which to draw direct comparisons and an established body of findings 
with regard to the specific form of the discount function.  The overall utility of the 
ADA task, however, is likely to be less than that of the AD task.  The lack of utility 
is due to the inconsistent findings between the standard and fully randomized 
versions of the task, where significant differences were found at the larger amount 
condition.  Furthermore, the mathematical form for the relationship between the 
delayed reward and the delay to receiving the reward cannot be evaluated, making 
empirical and theoretical connections to the discounting literature difficult. 
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  Recall that Green et al. (2007) examined whether adjusting-amount and 
adjusting-delay tasks provide equivalent measures of discounting in pigeons with 
real food rewards.  In that study, pigeons were given a choice between a smaller-
sooner outcome and a larger-later outcome.  In different conditions of the experiment, 
either the size of the smaller-sooner outcome was adjusted (analogous to the AIA 
task) or the length of the delay was adjusted (analogous to the AD task) based on the 
pigeon’s previous choice.  The purpose of both task types was to arrive at a point of 
indifference between the smaller-sooner and larger-later outcome which was then 
used as the test parameters for the other task.  The central question was whether 
similar rates of discounting would be observed between the two task types.  In 
contrast to the present study, the pigeons in the Green et al. study were consistent in 
their rates of discounting between the task types.   
It is notable that between species consistencies in findings would be 
important for a general process approach to temporal discounting, but the 
inconsistency in the findings between the current study and the Green et al. (2007) 
study may be due to one or more important factors.  For example, in the Green et al. 
study, hungry pigeons were given access to real food rewards whereas in the current 
study the participants experienced hypothetical monetary outcomes.  However, when 
comparing the discounting of real and hypothetical outcomes (e.g., Lagorio & 
Madden, 2005) or hypothetical consumable and generalized token rewards (e.g., 
Estle, Green, Myerson, & Holt, 2007), delay discounting appears to be qualitatively 
similar in humans regardless of outcome type.  Other inconsistencies between human 
and non-human discounting were revealed by Green, Myerson, Holt, Slevin, and 
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Estle (2004) where they failed to find a reliable effect of amount of reward on rate of 
discounting by pigeons and rats.  This is in contrast to findings from Estle et al. 
(2007) where a significant effect of amount was found for delayed consumable 
outcomes.  In the Estle et al. study, however, the consumable outcomes were 
hypothetical and the participants were not deprived, whereas the pigeons experienced 
the outcome (food pellets) and were food deprived.  Despite these procedural 
differences, the inconsistency between humans and non-human animals is important 
to note because amount effects are a robust finding in the human discounting 
literature.  Therefore, the inconsistencies found between the current and related 
animal study (Green et al., 2007) are not an isolated case. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) revealed how shifts in reference points (e.g., a 
gain versus a loss) affect choices that humans make under uncertainty.  That is, the 
choices made depend on how those choice situations are described.  Loewenstein 
(1988) also has shown, under conditions of intertemporal choice, that reference 
points affect decision making.  Loewenstein, in particular, found that individuals 
require more to delay an outcome than they are willing to pay to speed its delivery.  
Loewenstein attributed this asymmetrical pattern of choice behavior to differing 
reference points in the respective choice situations.   
In the Loewenstein (1988) study, some individuals were told about an 
immediately available outcome and then were told that they could have the receipt of 
that outcome delayed for some period of time.  The individuals were asked to 
indicate the amount of money they would need to have to offset the delay period 
(delay premium).  In another situation, individuals were told that they will receive an 
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outcome at some specified future time and then were asked how much they would be 
willing to give up to receive the outcome immediately (speed-up).  Loewenstein 
found that individuals required much more money to compensate for delaying the 
receipt of the outcome than they were willing to give up to speed-up the delivery of 
that outcome. 
 The inconsistencies across tasks in the present series of experiments also may 
be related to “reference points” in the AD and ADA tasks.  With the AD task, a 
participant made a series of choices between an immediately available outcome and 
a delayed outcome, neither of which changed in amount from choice to choice.  
Since both the immediate and delayed amounts remained constant across a series of 
choices, this may have produced a unique reference point where the length of the 
delay became relatively more important.  Recall that with the standard AD task, 
participants were less willing to wait than with the fully randomized version of the 
AD task.  Direct comparison to the choice asymmetry found by Loewenstein (1988) 
is not available within the current series of experiments, but the present results do 
suggest that a similar effect may be present in a standard AD task. 
 With the standard ADA task, a participant made a series of choices between 
an immediately available amount and an amount that was delayed, and both the 
immediate amount and the length of the delay were held constant from choice to 
choice.  The reference point here may have been established by the constancy of the 
immediate amounts across the series of choice trials (either $100 or $1,000).  With 
the standard ADA task, participants required a larger delayed amount than they did 
on the fully randomized ADA task (at least in the larger amount condition).  The 
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standard AD and ADA tasks produced steeper discounting than did their respective 
fully randomized version.  With both the AD and ADA tasks, the immediate amount 
remained unchanged across a series of choices.  It may be that holding the immediate 
amount constant across a series of choices leads to greater weighting of that amount. 
 The present findings reveal a systematic relation between the present value of 
an outcome and the delay to its receipt.  That is, as the delay to a reward increases, 
its subjective value decreases.  What has been uniquely revealed in the current series 
of experiments is that some discounting choice tasks have an unplanned effect on the 
subjective value of an outcome.  That is to say, with AD and ADA tasks, subjective 
value is determined not just by the size of the outcome or the delay to its receipt, but 
to some degree by the manner in which the choices themselves are presented.  
Therefore, when investigating intertemporal choice, the AIA task is likely to produce 
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